

Chapter Title: A System of Scars: The Problem of Ego Integration

Book Title: Critique on the Couch

Book Subtitle: Why Critical Theory Needs Psychoanalysis

Book Author(s): Amy Allen

Published by: Columbia University Press. (2021)

Stable URL: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7312/alle19860.6>

---

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [support@jstor.org](mailto:support@jstor.org).

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at <https://about.jstor.org/terms>



JSTOR

Columbia University Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to *Critique on the Couch*

## 2

# A System of Scars

## The Problem of Ego Integration

In his 1995 book, *Perversion and Utopia*, Joel Whitebook outlines what he calls “the problem of the ego” in Freud, a problem that stems from a deep tension, if not outright contradiction, in Freud’s work.<sup>1</sup> This tension is captured in the stark contrast between two of Freud’s best-known claims. On the one hand, there is Freud’s dictum “Where id was, there ego shall be”; on the other hand, his oft-cited contention that “*the ego is not the master in its own house*.”<sup>2</sup> The first statement supports a reading of Freud as a staunch defender of classical Enlightenment values such as rationality, autonomy, secular science, and progress. On this reading, which dovetails with the ego psychology school of psychoanalysis that rose to prominence in the mid-twentieth century in the United States, the goal of psychoanalysis is to strengthen the ego in its ongoing battle to master the instinctual impulses of the id. The second statement, by contrast, supports a mirror image reading of Freud as trenchant critic of the Enlightenment, whose theory of the unconscious undermines our faith in reason and autonomy by revealing the ego to be a narcissistic, imaginary construction that rests on fantasies of wholeness and mastery. On this broadly speaking Lacanian view, the aim of psychoanalysis is to engage in the discourse of the unconscious, and for this the ego must be dismantled rather than strengthened.

(How) can these two Freudian conceptions of the ego be reconciled? Whitebook maintains that if we are to do justice to the complexity of Freud’s vision, we cannot simply jettison one strand while championing the other.<sup>3</sup>

The challenge is to figure out how they might fit together. For Whitebook, the answer lies in the fact that the realization that the ego is not the master of its own house prompts a decentration and humbling of the ego that is crucial for the curbing of infantile omnipotence—and thus for the ego's own process of enlightenment.<sup>4</sup> Hence, the choice between strengthening or dismantling the dominating ego is a false one; the task, instead, is to envision a decentered, humbled, and finite yet still coherent ego capable of rationality and autonomy.

Whitebook finds the outlines of such a conception of the ego in Freud's late work *Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety*. There, Freud writes:

To return to the problem of the ego. The apparent contradiction is due to our having taken abstractions too rigidly and attended exclusively now to the one side and now to the other of what is in fact a complicated state of affairs. We were justified, I think, in dividing the ego from the id, for there are certain considerations which necessitate that step. On the other hand the ego is identical with the id, and is merely a specially differentiated part of it. If we think of this part by itself in contradistinction to the whole, or if a real split has occurred between the two, the weakness of the ego becomes apparent. But if the ego remains bound up with the id and indistinguishable from it, then it displays its strength.<sup>5</sup>

In this passage, Freud suggests a potential solution to the problem of the ego: the apparent contradiction between his claims about the ego's weakness relative to the id and his aspirations for its strength and mastery can be resolved when we understand ego weakness as a function of a dissociation or split between ego and id and ego strength, correspondingly, as a function of the merger or association between the two.<sup>6</sup> Along these lines, Freud understands repression here as the ego's refusal to associate itself with certain instinctual impulses; this refusal requires a great deal of the ego's energy to maintain and generates symptoms that emerge at the site of the split-off impulses.<sup>7</sup> On this revised picture, Whitebook contends, the aim of psychoanalysis is not ego's domination of id impulses but rather the achievement of an "expanded unity" of the ego through a process of "undoing repressions" that enables "'free intercourse' with the split-off foreign material."<sup>8</sup> As Whitebook explains, "The ego does not most effectively establish 'mastery' over the id, as is often assumed, by dissociating itself from

and suppressing the id's instinctual material. On the contrary, it achieves this end and enriches itself at the same time and to the same extent by establishing 'free intercourse' with that material."<sup>9</sup> According to this reading, Freud offers here a new conception of ego strength that provides a way out of the problem of the ego, though this is a relatively underdeveloped aspect of his work that many of his readers have failed to appreciate.<sup>10</sup>

In this chapter, I contend that Klein's account of ego strength and integration should be understood not in terms of the triumph of the narcissistic ego against the discourse of the unconscious, but along the lines that Whitebook has traced: as a function of its expansion and enrichment through the ongoing incorporation of previously split-off unconscious content. To the extent that this is the case, Klein's account of ego strength can escape the sharp critique of the ego articulated not only by Lacan but also by Adorno. Moreover, Klein's account provides important resources for critical theorists looking to move beyond the distinctively Adornian version of the problem of the ego. Although Lacan and Adorno both criticize the ego for its rigidity, its narcissistic and paranoid structure, and its implication in what Adorno calls the domination of inner nature, Adorno, unlike Lacan, clings steadfastly to the standpoint of the ego on the grounds that it is necessary for the formation of autonomy and thus for critical resistance to fascism and authoritarianism.<sup>11</sup> This generates a perhaps intentionally unresolved paradox at the heart of Adorno's conception of the ego, one that seems to leave us stuck embracing an authoritarian, narcissistic ego (and the nuclear family structures that are allegedly necessary for its development) in order to preserve the possibility of critique.

Klein helps us to envision a way out of this paradox, by providing a model of psychic integration that corresponds with Adorno's fleeting and suggestive but underdeveloped remarks on the possibility of genuine reconciliation and the structure of nonreified cognition.<sup>12</sup> As Peter Dews has emphasized, Adorno's critique of the ego was deeply historically indexed; he viewed the compulsive, coercive mode of ego integration to have been necessary at a certain stage of history, as part of human being's attempt to liberate themselves from the fearsome power of nature. "Accordingly," Dews continues, "the 'spell of selfhood' cannot be seen simply as an extension of natural coercion; rather, it is an illusion which could, in principle, be reflectively broken through by the subject which it generates—although the full realization of this process would be inseparable from a transformation of social

relations.”<sup>13</sup> Klein’s conception of ego integration, I contend, provides a model of what subjectivity might look like once it has broken through the spell of the coercive, compulsive, dominating mode of ego identity. Hers is a model not of the dissolution of the ego, but rather of what Dews calls a “true identity” that “would be permeable to its own non-identical moment.”<sup>14</sup> The Kleinian integrated ego is, to borrow Adorno’s evocative description, “a system of scars which are integrated only under suffering, and never completely.”<sup>15</sup>

In order to make this case, I will begin by reviewing the paradoxes that emerge as a function of Adorno’s critique of the ego. Although I defend Adorno against what I call the paradox of self-defeat, I argue that there is a residual paradox of authoritarianism in his work. Following Jessica Benjamin, I contend that the way out of this paradox is through intersubjectivity; however, in order to avoid the challenges raised in Adorno’s critique of revisionist psychoanalysis, intersubjectivity must be understood in Kleinian terms. Klein combines her complex and ambivalent conception of intersubjectivity with a noncoercive, nondominating, and open-ended conception of ego integration. This conception not only avoids Adorno’s critique of the ego—it also resonates powerfully with his fleeting references to the character of nonreified cognition, nonidentity thinking, and genuine reconciliation.

## Paradoxes of the Ego (in Adorno)

The idea that the rational ego is a coercive, narcissistic, paranoid, and dominating structure is a prominent theme in Adorno’s critical theory, closely linked to his reading of Freudian psychoanalysis. This theme emerges perhaps most clearly in the *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, where Adorno and Horkheimer mobilize Nietzschean and Freudian insights to produce a damning critique of the formation of modern, bourgeois subjectivity through the domination of inner nature.<sup>16</sup> Drawing on Freud’s critique of civilization as founded on the renunciation of instinctual drives and his account of the ego as the psychic agency tasked with bringing the id to heel under its rational mastery, Adorno and Horkheimer transform this structural account into a historical one, generating a searing indictment of

bourgeois society's entanglement with domination. Their understanding of the relationship between the formation of rational, bourgeois subjectivity and the domination of inner nature is summed up in one of the most famous and striking passages from *Dialectic of Enlightenment*: "Humanity had to inflict terrible injuries on itself before the self—the identical, purpose-directed, masculine character of human beings—was created, and something of this process is repeated in every childhood. The effort to hold itself together attends the ego at all its stages, and the temptation to be rid of the ego has always gone hand-in-hand with the blind determination to preserve it."<sup>17</sup> In other words, the ego is held together through violence, through an injurious relation to inner nature.

Adorno and Horkheimer's psychoanalytically inspired critique of the ego culminates in one of the central theses of the text: "The history of civilization is the history of the introversion of sacrifice—in other words, the history of renunciation."<sup>18</sup> Adorno and Horkheimer exemplify this thesis through their interpretation of Odysseus—whom they anachronistically describe as the "prototype of the bourgeois individual"—insofar as he must continually sacrifice parts or aspects of himself in order to save himself.<sup>19</sup> Although many examples from Homer's *Odyssey* are offered in support of this claim, the familiar story of Odysseus's encounter with Polyphemus illustrates this logic particularly well. As Adorno and Horkheimer tell it, the key to Odysseus's escape from Polyphemus's cave is that, when the Cyclops asks his name, Odysseus cleverly replies, "Nobody." Although his escape is also a function of his cunning, Adorno and Horkheimer read this utterance as an act of linguistic self-sacrifice on Odysseus's part. As they put it, "He declares allegiance to himself by disowning himself as Nobody; he saves his life by making himself disappear."<sup>20</sup> The lesson that Adorno and Horkheimer draw from this story is that Odysseus's "self-assertion, as in the entire epic, as in all civilization, is self-repudiation."<sup>21</sup>

Later, in *Negative Dialectics*, Adorno extends this critique of the ego into a critique of Kantian morality, which, for him, is predicated on absolutizing "the solid identically maintained authority" of the ego as "the necessary premise of morality."<sup>22</sup> Freudian psychoanalysis reveals what Kant did not yet realize: "The empirical genesis of what, unanalyzed, was glorified by him as timelessly intelligible."<sup>23</sup> This is true not only for the superego, which is empirically rooted in "blindly, unconsciously internalized social coercion,"<sup>24</sup> but also for the ego, which, Adorno contends, "is not something

immediate. The ego itself is mediated. It has arisen from psychoanalytic termini: it has branched off from the diffuse energy of the libido.”<sup>25</sup> Although Kant acknowledges the heteronomous and compulsive nature of conscience (the superego), arguing for its dissolution in practical reason, he does not acknowledge the extent to which the “unreflected rule of reason, the ego’s rule over the id, is identical with the repressive principle.”<sup>26</sup>

However, as Whitebook has argued, this way of taking up the Freudian account of the ego generates serious problems for Adorno’s account. Specifically, Whitebook identifies two paradoxes that emerge in Adorno’s critique of the ego. The first, which I will call the paradox of self-defeat, arises from the fact that Adorno and Horkheimer “equate the autocratic ego with the ego as such. For them the integration of the self is inherently violent.”<sup>27</sup> This means, according to Whitebook, that Adorno and Horkheimer are stuck claiming that not only the process of ego formation but also, by extension, the very project of enlightenment itself is “self-defeating” in the sense that “it systematically eliminates the possibility of achieving its own goal.”<sup>28</sup> As a result, they implicitly undermine the possibility of finding a way out of the dialectic of enlightenment and are left longing for an impossible and unimaginable utopia.<sup>29</sup> On Whitebook’s reading, their radical critique of the ego is at least partly responsible for generating the theoretical impasse that leads Adorno and Horkheimer into political quietism and conservatism.<sup>30</sup>

The source of this problem, as Whitebook sees it, is that Adorno and Horkheimer understand the ego as a primarily defensive structure tasked with the maintenance of boundaries, the control of the instinctual impulses emanating from the id, and the enforcement of rationality. But to take this as an account of the ego *per se* is, as Whitebook notes, to equate “a pathological mode of ego formation, namely, the obsessional, with the ego as such.”<sup>31</sup> By identifying this pathological mode of ego formation with the ego as such, Adorno and Horkheimer fail to avail themselves of the resources afforded by the alternative conception of psychic integration found in Freud’s late work, according to which ego strength is a function not of repression and mastery of instinctual nature but rather of greater openness to and incorporation of unconscious content (inner nature).

Whitebook contends that Adorno’s aesthetic theory offers readers some glimpses of what a nonreified form of synthesis or relation to the world might look like. In his aesthetic theory, Adorno sketches a “*logic* that might



govern the integration of a nonreified society in the future, where whole and part, universal and particular, would be held together in a different way.”<sup>32</sup> This logic is based on the kind of “‘nonviolent togetherness of the manifold’ he [Adorno] thought he perceived in advanced works of art.”<sup>33</sup> And yet Adorno never fully developed a corresponding model of psychic integration; had he done so, he might have been able to imagine a way out of the dialectic of enlightenment. On Whitebook’s reading, however, Adorno couldn’t take this step because he “*identified the obsessional ego with the ego as such*.”<sup>34</sup> This assumption prevented him “from considering less coercive forms of ego integration that could become the basis for possible forms of postconventional identity.”<sup>35</sup>

Moreover, the corollary of this conception of the compulsive and coercive character of the rational ego is an understanding of freedom as the dissolution of the ego. Adorno and Horkheimer seem to endorse such a conception in the *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, for example, when they claim that “the fear of losing the self, and suspending with it the boundary between oneself and other life, the aversion to death and destruction, is twinned with a promise of joy that has threatened civilization at every moment.”<sup>36</sup> But the dissolution of the ego is typically a transient state, one that can be experienced in moments of ecstasy or intoxication; as such, it cannot be an ongoing alternative to the coerciveness of the ego. Thus, according to Whitebook, although Adorno illuminates clearly the stark choice between rigid, coercive, yet rational unity and freedom that comes at the cost of dissolution, he is unable to move beyond this diagnosis. He leaves us stuck with a problematic choice between the “rigidly integrated ego of conventional identity and the Dionysian dissolution of the self.”<sup>37</sup> Moreover, for Whitebook, it is Adorno’s “assumption that the unity of the self must necessarily be coercive” that “prevents him from appropriating his own insights.”<sup>38</sup>

However, Whitebook’s claim that Adorno and Horkheimer view ego integration as *inherently* violent and coercive is questionable. Unlike Whitebook, I read *Dialectic of Enlightenment* as telling a more historically contingent story about the development of enlightenment and related notions such as bourgeois rationality or subjectivity. Although it is true that the text posits an essential tension between enlightenment rationality in the broad sense and power relations understood as the control or domination of inner and outer nature, and it aims at illuminating this conceptual aporia, it also



insists that the particular unfolding of this entanglement that has led to the barbarism and totalitarianism of the twentieth century must be understood as historically contingent. In other words, it is a mistake, I think, to read *Dialectic of Enlightenment* as offering a negative philosophy of history. Although the concept of bourgeois enlightenment subjectivity is, in a broad sense, entangled with the domination of inner nature, the particular forms that this takes in modern capitalist societies are contingent. Recognizing this point is essential for understanding the sense in which *Dialectic of Enlightenment* aims to hold up a mirror to enlightenment in order to enable it to disentangle itself from blind domination.<sup>39</sup> If this way of reading the text is compelling, then it follows that the target of Adorno and Horkheimer's critique is not the ego or the self per se, but the form of ego integration required under bourgeois capitalism. This, in turn, suggests that the point is not to celebrate the Dionysian dissolution of the ego but rather to criticize the type of society in which such dissolution comes to look like freedom. Indeed, Adorno suggests as much in the following passage from *Negative Dialectics*: "If the role, the heteronomy prescribed by autonomy, is the latest objective form of an unhappy consciousness, there is, conversely, no happiness except where the self is not itself. Historically, the subject has fought its way out of a state of dissociation and ambiguity, and if the immense pressure that weighs upon it hurls the self back into that state—into schizophrenia—the subject's dissolution presents at the same time the ephemeral and condemned picture of a possible subject."<sup>40</sup> In other words, a conception of autonomy predicated upon the domination of inner nature and an account of heteronomy understood as the dissolution of the self are mirror images of each other, and both are objective forms of an unhappy consciousness. The dissolution of the subject is thus not a genuine realization of freedom but rather an "ephemeral and condemned" state.

Thus, Adorno and Horkheimer's critique of the ego is not, as Whitebook fears, necessarily self-defeating. To be sure, they do not offer a fully developed alternative account of a less violent, nondominating mode of subject-formation or ego integration. As Whitebook himself notes, however, important glimpses of such an account can be found scattered throughout Adorno's work. I will return to these issues later in the chapter and argue that Adorno's account of nonreified subjectivity can be productively extended by drawing on Kleinian insights. For now, let me turn to the second paradox of the ego that emerges in Adorno's work: the

paradox of authoritarianism. This paradox emerges as a result of the historical dimension of Adorno and Horkheimer's critique of the ego—that is, it is a function of the very feature of their view that rescues them from the paradox of self-defeat. To state the problem simply: even if one emphasizes the historical dimension of their critique of the ego, it is still the case that they view the autonomous, rational ego as *both* a structure of internalized domination *and* a necessary condition for resistance to fascism and authoritarianism.<sup>41</sup>

Jessica Benjamin articulates this paradox beautifully in her classic article, "The End of Internalization": "At the center of critical theory's analysis of modern capitalism is a paradox about the nature of resistance to domination. Those aspects of consciousness where this resistance might be located—critical reason, individuation, integrity and ultimately resistance itself—are tied to the process of internalizing authority. As a result, the rejection of authority can only take place through its prior acceptance."<sup>42</sup> In other words, however historically indexed their critique of the (bourgeois, rational, paranoid, narcissistic) ego may be, Adorno and Horkheimer regard this specific structure of internalized domination as necessary for both individual autonomy and genuine resistance to modern capitalism. Thus, they see great danger in the emergence of new, postliberal forms of capitalism and mass society where authority is increasingly exercised directly over individuals, rather than being mediated through processes of psychic internalization that take shape within the context of the bourgeois family. In this postliberal, mass society context, possibilities for critique and resistance are increasingly foreclosed. As Benjamin puts it: "In the face of this situation the critical theorists look backward to the form of instinctual control which was the basis for ego development and reason in the past—individual internalization—and argue that only it contained a potential for the formation of a critique of domination."<sup>43</sup>

Lars Rensmann has demonstrated that Adorno and Horkheimer's claim about ego weakness in mass society was crucial to their analysis of anti-Semitism and of the authoritarian personality.<sup>44</sup> As more direct and unmediated forms of individual domination emerge in postliberal societies, the result is a decrease in individual autonomy and a corresponding increase in social conformity. This sets the stage for their diagnosis of the authoritarian personality, a Weberian ideal type of modern subjectivity that is particularly prone to endorsing fascism, racism, and modern anti-Semitism.<sup>45</sup>

Rensmann contends that the “essential link” among the various elements of the authoritarian personality—conventionalism, submissiveness to authority, aggression, coldness, love of power, cynicism, tendency to stereotypical thinking and projection, and fixation on sexuality—is the weakness of the ego in postliberal subjectivity.<sup>46</sup> Ego weakness renders the individual incapable of mastering internal conflict, including, most notably, the demands of the superego. Under such conditions, individuals are more likely to externalize their conscience in the form of blind submission to an authoritarian leader.

A full discussion of the theoretical and methodological complexities of the authoritarian personality study is beyond the scope of this discussion.<sup>47</sup> Fortunately the basic conceptual outlines of the paradox of authoritarianism are visible in other Adornian texts, including his well-known essay “Freudian Theory and the Pattern of Fascist Propaganda.” There, Adorno argues that ego weakness is the psychological structure that underlies and makes fascist propaganda effective. Indeed, he maintains that the distinctive problem of the current historical moment—the essay was written in 1951—is “the decline of the individual and his subsequent weakness.”<sup>48</sup> The main question of this essay is what transforms otherwise rational individuals into a mass who will support aims that are incompatible with their own rational self-interest. On Adorno’s analysis, fascism is authoritarian in its structure; therefore, individuals undergo the regression that transforms them into a mass because of their willingness to submit to authority. This means, in turn, that fascism rests on and exploits authoritarian personality structures. Fascism exploits the tendency to ego weakness by directly manipulating and controlling the unconscious: “For, while psychology always denotes some bondage of the individual, it also presupposes freedom in the sense of a certain self-sufficiency and autonomy of the individual.”<sup>49</sup>

Adorno’s engagement with psychoanalysis, then, seems to lead to a paradox after all. Although it can be rescued from the paradox of self-defeat, Adorno’s critique of the ego does seem starkly at odds with his lament for the ego weakness that results from the decline of the bourgeois individual. (How) do these two aspects of Adorno’s conception of the ego fit together? Is the dominating, coercive, rational ego a necessary evil, the price that must be paid for defending civilization against the regressive dangers of fascism?<sup>50</sup> To be sure, one could double down here and defend Adorno by pointing

out that he is simply calling our attention to one of the contradictions of our own society. This, after all, is what he sees as the job of the critical theorist, given that we live in a thoroughly antagonistic society, a society that “is not a society *with* contradictions or *despite* its contradictions, but *by virtue of* its contradictions.”<sup>51</sup> It is the deeply antagonistic, contradictory nature of our society that gives rise to the need for a negative dialectics, a dialectics not of identity but of nonidentity, a dialectics that, rather than culminating in a higher order synthesis, strives to articulate the unreconciled state of our concepts and our social reality.<sup>52</sup> Following this line of thinking, perhaps Adorno would say that the whole point is to articulate without resolving the contradictory, antagonistic tendencies in contemporary societies because only on this basis is genuine critique possible.

Still, this response seems to leave Adorno in the uncomfortable position of claiming that we can only be against fascism in our politics by being for what Foucault would later refer to as the fascism in our heads.<sup>53</sup> From a feminist perspective, it also leaves him in the regrettable position of lamenting the decline of the patriarchal bourgeois family, at least to the extent that this family structure and its concomitant Oedipal drama is thought to be necessary for the process of socialization to autonomy.<sup>54</sup> Moreover, as Adorno himself says in another context about a different paradox, “it would be an intellectual defeatism to leave the impasse as it is.”<sup>55</sup>

The challenge posed by the paradox of authoritarianism is this: How can we envision an account of psychic integration that is not only noncoercive and nondominating but that also allows for the possibility of resistance, autonomy, and critique? If such a possibility could be envisioned, then we would not be stuck celebrating an authoritarian mode of ego integration—and the patriarchal family structures on which it is based—in order to salvage the possibility of autonomy. Benjamin suggests that the key is to take a route not envisioned by early critical theory (but certainly well explored by subsequent generations): intersubjectivity. She asks: Could “the possibility of resisting authority . . . not be grounded in that aspect of the subject which once accepted authority, but instead in that aspect which seeks mutuality? Could not the potential for emancipation be grounded in an intersubjective theory of personality, rather than an individual psychology of internalization?”<sup>56</sup> This is not to deny Adorno and Horkheimer’s diagnostic claim about the dangers of the more direct forms of domination that have emerged with the rise of the culture industry; it is simply to suggest

that critical theorists need not throw their lot in with bourgeois subjectivity in order to preserve the possibility of resistance to such dangers. We might instead turn to intersubjectivity as a resource for rethinking autonomy. Still, this strategy raises a further problem: if we are not to run afoul of Adorno's warning about false forms of reconciliation that obscure existing social antagonisms, we will have to avoid the facile turn to intersubjectivity that Adorno criticized so devastatingly in his discussion of revisionist psychoanalysis. In the following sections, I argue that Klein offers an intersubjective psychoanalytic perspective that avoids Adorno's critique of revisionism and provides us with a model of ego integration that is noncoercive, nondominating, and open-ended.<sup>57</sup>

## Adorno's Critique of Revisionism

Revisionist psychoanalysis was Adorno's term for the post-Freudian school of psychoanalysis that rejected Freud's theory of the drives and emphasized the importance of social and cultural environment on individuals.<sup>58</sup> Given Klein's embrace of drive theory in general and the death drive in particular, it might seem obvious that her view is not vulnerable to this critique. However, it is worth recalling the main points of Adorno's critique of the revisionists, because doing so will bring some further attractive features of her view into focus.

Adorno's critique turns on his complex and dialectical understanding of the relationship between individual and society and, relatedly, between psychology and sociology. For Adorno, the methodological and intellectual split between the disciplines of psychology and sociology both reflects the real antagonism between the individual and society in contemporary capitalism and, at the same time, blocks our ability to understand it. Thus, he claims that "the separation of society and psyche is false consciousness" inasmuch as it "perpetuates conceptually the split between the living subject and the objectivity that governs the subjects and yet derives from them," but "false consciousness is also true"<sup>59</sup> inasmuch as—as a matter of fact under bourgeois capitalism—"inner and outer life are torn apart."<sup>60</sup> The split between individual and society is thus both true, insofar as it is reflective of social reality, and false, insofar as it perpetuates and justifies the social

antagonism that it expresses. For Adorno, reflecting on this antagonism by bringing the insights of psychology (specifically psychoanalysis) and sociology together is crucially important, but this does not mean integrating the two perspectives into a seamless whole. For Adorno, the integration of sociology and psychology is “an expression of helplessness, not progress. There is more hope that concentration on the particular isolate will break through its monadic crust to disclose the universal mediation at its core than that the conceptual synthesis of real decomposition could actually stop the rot. The only totality the student of society can presume to know is the antagonistic whole, and if he is to attain to totality at all, then only in and through contradiction.”<sup>61</sup> In other words, we stand to gain more by concentrating on one side of the diremption between individual and society, on what Adorno calls “the particular isolate”; such an approach is more likely to yield insight into “the universal mediation” at the core of such phenomena.

The general thesis of Adorno’s critique of revisionist psychoanalysis is, then, that it represents a false and problematic way of relating psychology to sociology, one that denies and obscures rather than articulating and illuminating the fundamental antagonism between individual and society. Revisionism is thus a “sociologization of psychoanalysis” that emphasizes social, cultural, and environmental influences on the psyche “at the expense of hidden mechanisms of the unconscious.”<sup>62</sup> As such it is too superficial to provide critical insights into society.

Adorno defends this thesis in a variety of ways. On a methodological level, he argues that the revisionists’ rejection of drive theory commits them to an excessively rationalistic account of the psyche that “sever[s] the ego from its genetic relationship to the id” and that “amounts to a negation of [Freud’s] theory.”<sup>63</sup> Relatedly, revisionists downplay or overlook the role of trauma and damage in Freud’s account of the psyche and, more generally, seem uninterested in the impact of the individual’s past on their present character or personality. For Adorno, this approach obscures the fact that “a totality of the character, assumed by the revisionists as given, is an ideal which would be realized only in a non-traumatic society. . . . The totality of the so-called ‘character’ is fictitious: one could almost call it a system of scars, which are integrated only under suffering, and never completely.”<sup>64</sup> Indeed, Adorno contends that the revisionists are committed to “a harmonious belief in the unity of a person, which is impossible in the existing

society, perhaps is not even desirable at all.<sup>65</sup> By eliminating castration—the primordial traumatic experience, for Freud, and one that, according to Lacan, splits the subject in a way that permanently undoes the possibility of psychic unity, totality, or harmony—from psychoanalysis, the revisionists have in fact castrated psychoanalysis, rendering it unable to illuminate contemporary social reality.<sup>66</sup>

Furthermore, by failing to acknowledge the diremption between society and individual, the revisionists are led—perhaps unintentionally—to a position of naïve optimism, social conformism, and conventional morality.<sup>67</sup> Unlike Freud, whose thinking about morality was fundamentally antagonistic—marked by “on the one side, psychological-genetic dissolution of the moralistic ideas, through reduction to the origin of the super-ego and the neurotic guilt feelings; on the other side, the abstract proclamation of moral values untouched by the psychological insights”—the revisionists simply side uncritically with existing societal morality.<sup>68</sup> Misunderstanding the source of the conflict between individual and society, revisionism expresses a “sympathy for adaptation” to contemporary society.<sup>69</sup> In so doing, revisionism betrays the best insights of Freud, who, although he did not “proceed from sociological categories,” nevertheless “understood the pressure of the society on the individual in its concrete forms.”<sup>70</sup> Ironically, although revisionism was motivated in part by a reaction against Freudian orthodoxy and authoritarianism, revisionist psychoanalysis is, because of its conformist tendencies, friendlier to authoritarianism and repression than Freudian thought was.<sup>71</sup> Whereas Freud’s work emphasizes the divide between individual and society and thus the painful and traumatic nature of adaptation to reality, revisionism, by contrast, “wants to overcome this negativity by treating the inhumane relationships as if they were already human.”<sup>72</sup>

Finally, Adorno attacks the revisionists’ turn to love as an antidote to Freud’s authoritarian coldness. Their emphasis on love as an analytic tool overlooks the possibility that Freud “makes himself so austere in order to break the petrified conditions.”<sup>73</sup> Adorno continues: “The possibility of change is not promoted by the falsehood that after all, we are all brothers but only by dealing with the existing antagonisms. Freud’s coldness, which expels every fictitious immediacy between doctor and patient, and openly admits the professionally mediated nature of the therapy, does more honor to the idea of humanity by unrelentingly eliminating its appearance than



comforting consolation and warmth of command do.”<sup>74</sup> With their emphasis on “comforting consolation and warmth,” revisionists seek to deny a more ambivalent experience of love, one that “necessarily contains the admixture of despair.”<sup>75</sup> For Adorno, this is the only kind of love possible under current social conditions; the revisionists overlook the possibility that perhaps “Freud’s misanthropy is nothing else than hopeless love and the only expression of hope which still remains.”<sup>76</sup> However misanthropic it may be, Freud’s hopeless love expresses hope by reflecting something true about the existing diremption between individual and society.

Indeed, Adorno contends that Freud’s greatness as a thinker lies precisely in his willingness to leave such contradictions unresolved and to scorn “the pretended systematic harmony where things in themselves are torn asunder.”<sup>77</sup> In so doing, Freud “makes the antagonistic character of social reality apparent” and “reveals something of objective unreason.”<sup>78</sup> The revisionists, by contrast, smooth over the contradictions of Freudian theory: “In their hands, Freudian theory turns into another means which assimilates psychological movements to the social status quo.”<sup>79</sup> For them “society and the individual, adaptation to the all-powerful reality and happiness coincide.”<sup>80</sup> By replacing Freud’s emphasis on the conflictual and ambivalent drives with an account of social, cultural, and environmental influences on individual psychology, the revisionists turn a blind eye to the antagonistic relation between individual and society and endorse conformity and adaptation to the status quo as the goals of analysis. Ironically, in their attempt to do justice to the relationship between social and cultural forces and individual psychology, the revisionists deprive themselves of the resources that could enable them to illuminate this relationship. By contrast, “rigorous psychoanalytic theory, alive to the clash of psychic forces, can better drive home the objective character especially of economic laws as against subjective impulses, than theories which, in order at all costs to establish a continuum between society and psyche, deny the fundamental axiom of analytic theory, the conflict between id and ego.”<sup>81</sup> Psychoanalysis captures the historical truth of contemporary society—even if it doesn’t understand this as a historical truth—only when it focuses on the individual psyche and its internal conflicts.

How does Kleinian psychoanalysis fare in the light of Adorno’s critique of revisionism? First of all, as should be clear from my discussion in the

previous chapter, although Klein is not inattentive to the impact of environmental factors on individual development, and although she recasts Freud's theory of the drives in a relational mode, she remains a drive theorist. Given her commitments to primary aggression, to the fundamental ambivalence of the drives, and to the ineliminable nature of unconscious phantasy, Klein's theory is very much an id psychology, not an ego psychology. As Fred Alford puts this point, Klein's drive theory "connects her work to that part of Freud's that the Frankfurt School found so valuable: the demanding, not readily civilized nature of the drives."<sup>82</sup> In this respect, Alford continues, Klein avoids the "neo-Freudian revisionism' the Frankfurt School so carefully sought to avoid."<sup>83</sup>

Moreover, because of her distinctive psychological and relational conception of the drives—according to which drives are modes of relating to others either destructively or lovingly—Klein avoids the problems that Adorno diagnoses in neo-Freudian revisionism without resorting to a problematically reductionist biologicistic conception of the drives. As Whitebook notes, given their worries about the facile, Whiggish progressivism of revisionist psychoanalysis, Adorno and Horkheimer favored a biologicistic interpretation of classical Freudian drive theory. In light of her commitment to primary aggression, Klein preserves what Whitebook calls the "the moment of essential non-identity between individual and society," but she does so without rooting this moment in an "inassimilable biological core of the individual."<sup>84</sup> Klein thus provides a third alternative, beyond the biologicistic articulation of drive theory and the revisionist alternative: a psychoanalytic theory that emphasizes antagonism, nonidentity, and ambivalence without relying on a reductive biologism about drives.

But what about the charge of social conformism? Does Klein's emphasis on the integration of the personality render her conception of psychoanalysis problematically conformist? To be sure, Klein emphasizes the reality principle and the importance of bringing one's internal objects into closer alignment with external reality; in that sense, Klein endorses the idea that psychoanalysis aims toward some sort of adaptation to reality. However, as I argued in the previous chapter, Klein also believes that because of the ineliminable role of unconscious phantasy in structuring and filtering our relationships with others, the gap between our internal and external objects can never be fully closed. Thus, complete integration of individual psychic

reality and external social or environmental situations is, on her view, in principle impossible.

Finally, given the crucial role of love in Klein's theory, particularly in explaining the move to the depressive position, does she not fall prey to Adorno's critique of the revisionists' emphasis on love? On this point, it is worth noting that Adorno seems primarily concerned with the revisionists' focus on love in the context of analytic treatment. And it is true that analysis of the transference is central to Klein's conception of analytic technique. A primary goal of analysis, for Klein, is to enable the analysand to more securely establish her internal good object, which in turn helps to facilitate further integration.<sup>85</sup> In some sense, this requires the analyst to *be* the good object for the analysand. This means that for Klein, the analyst's job is to supply love, support, and nourishment so that the analysand can more securely internalize the good object and draw on it for the integration, expansion, and enrichment of the ego.

Although this might make it seem as if the Kleinian analyst offers unconditional affirmation to the analysand—the kind of “comforting consolation and warmth” that Adorno mocks as unable to coldly and austere stand up to the contradictory and antagonistic nature of existing social relations—in fact, nothing could be further from the truth. For Klein, if the analyst occupies the role of the good object, the analogue for the milk that the analyst/good breast provides isn't affirmation, consolation, or warmth but rather *interpretations*. As Klein states: “As in infancy, repeated happy experiences of being fed and loved are instrumental in establishing securely the good object, so during an analysis repeated experiences of the effectiveness and truth of interpretations given lead to the analyst—and retrospectively the primal object—being built up as good figures.”<sup>86</sup> In other words, the analyst's task, for Klein, is to give the analysand good, nourishing interpretations—even if (and perhaps even especially when) doing so requires telling the analysand something they do not want to hear. Moreover, Klein's account of analytic transference is, like her account of love more generally, highly ambivalent. As she explains in her account of envy, the analysand frequently not only rejects a good interpretation, but then goes further and expresses hostility toward the analyst. Klein understands this as an instance of wanting to spoil the milk from the good breast, and, by extension, of wanting to spoil the analyst as a good object precisely

because it is good.<sup>87</sup> Both love and analytic transference are, for Klein, deeply marked by ambivalence and as such contain a significant “admixture of despair.”

In sum, despite her emphasis on intersubjectivity, Klein’s commitments to drive theory, primary aggression, and ambivalence render her conception fundamentally distinct from that of the revisionists. Moreover, her thoroughly relational conception of the drives provides a way of preserving the negative, antagonistic moment that Adorno found so crucial in drive theory without resorting to a reductive biologism.

## Klein on Ego Integration

This brings me to Klein’s account of ego integration, which, I contend, not only avoids Adorno’s critique of the ego but also provides a way out of the paradox of authoritarianism in which Adorno remains mired, one that corresponds to his own fleeting sketches of a nonreified relationship between subject and object. This might seem like a strange suggestion; after all, Adorno tended to be extremely critical of any and all talk of integration.<sup>88</sup> On his view, integration is closely aligned with identity thinking: the subsumptive logic by means of which concrete particularity and difference are swallowed up by concepts is a logic of integration. The centrality of this theme to his critical theory and his deep-seated opposition to this logic are both evident from the fact that he frequently referred to his own philosophical method of negative dialectics as a logic of *disintegration*.<sup>89</sup> For him, the logic of integration is characteristic of both modern philosophy—in particular of the idealist tradition of Kant and Hegel—and of capitalist modernity. The integrative logic of modern capitalism is a central theme in Adorno and Horkheimer’s critique of the culture industry, which, they claim, destroys spontaneity and difference, enforces sameness and uniformity, and absorbs consumers into the universal by positioning them as fungible, replaceable stereotypes.<sup>90</sup> In so doing, the culture industry directly imprints the power of bourgeois capitalism onto individuals.<sup>91</sup> For Adorno and Horkheimer, “the miracle of integration, the permanent benevolence of those in command, who admit the unresisting subject while he chokes down his unruliness—all this signifies fascism.”<sup>92</sup> This logic of integration

that is characteristic of modern, bourgeois capitalism culminates in the violence of the Holocaust. As Adorno puts the point with characteristic bluntness: "Genocide is the absolute integration."<sup>93</sup>

It therefore makes sense that Adorno was sharply critical of psychoanalytic approaches that focus on integration. For him, to say that the goal of psychoanalysis was the achievement of a well-integrated psyche was to suggest that the subject should reconcile itself to a world that is riven by internal conflict and contradiction. Such integration constitutes, for Adorno, "a false reconciliation with an unreconciled world."<sup>94</sup> Moreover, for Adorno, ego integration and ego strength ultimately converge, since, in the context of bourgeois capitalism, the well-integrated ego is one that has successfully mastered its internal conflicts, brought its instinctual nature to heel.

In light of this, Klein's frequent references to ego strength and ego integration as the goals of analysis might seem to rule out in advance any sort of rapprochement between Klein and Adorno. Indeed, Klein goes so far as to claim that integration is at the core of her conception of psychoanalysis when she restates Freud's famous dictum "Where id was there ego shall be" as follows: "The ultimate aim of psycho-analysis is the integration of the patient's personality."<sup>95</sup> Although this might at first glance suggest adherence to a problematic account of ego integration predicated upon the internalization of domination, once we understand correctly what Klein means by the integration of the self that is called for in this passage, we will see that her account actually coheres with Adorno's remarkably well. Indeed, Klein provides a productive model of the psyche that corresponds to Adorno's fragmentary and incomplete gestures toward a vision of nonreified cognition.

As I discussed in the previous chapter, Klein maintains that there is a rudimentary and relatively incoherent ego in place from the beginning of life, and that it is this ego that engages in early object relations. To review briefly: initially, object relations are organized in the paranoid-schizoid position. In this position, the ego "largely lacks cohesion, and a tendency towards integration alternates with a tendency towards disintegration, a falling into bits."<sup>96</sup> This corresponds to a high degree of persecutory anxiety, a fear that the rudimentary ego will be annihilated, and to a corresponding tendency to split objects into good/loving and bad/persecutory as a defense against that anxiety. The move from the paranoid-schizoid position—in which the psyche experiences both itself and its objects as split, fragmented,

and partial—to the depressive position is facilitated by the introjection of the good breast, which “counteracts the processes of splitting and dispersal, makes for cohesiveness and integration, and is instrumental in building up the ego.”<sup>97</sup> The key moment in the transition to the depressive position is when the infant recognizes the mother, who has up to now been split into good and bad part-objects (i.e., good and bad breasts), as a whole object. This move represents a more integrated mode of experience, whereby the infant realizes that the bad, persecutory breast that they have attacked and destroyed in phantasy is one and the same as the loving, nourishing good breast that they both love and depend upon, but it also gives rise to depressive anxiety, rooted in the fear of the annihilation of the loved object.

As the infant moves into the depressive position, they experience both their objects and themselves in a more integrated way—indeed, developing the capacity for integration is one of the defining features of the depressive position. As Klein puts it: “I see the formation of the ego as an entity to be largely determined by the alternation between splitting and repression on the one hand, and integration in relation to objects on the other.”<sup>98</sup>

But what precisely does integration mean for Klein? Consider the following passage:

With the introjection of the complete object in about the second quarter of the first year marked steps in integration are made. This implies important changes in the relation to objects. The loved and hated aspects of the mother are no longer felt to be so widely separated, and the result is an increased fear of loss, states akin to mourning and a strong feeling of guilt, because the aggressive impulses are felt to be directed against the loved object. The depressive position has come to the fore. The very experience of depressive feelings in turn has the effect of further integrating the ego, because it makes for an increased understanding of psychic reality and better perception of the external world, as well as for a greater synthesis between inner and external situations.<sup>99</sup>

As this passage makes clear, integration, for Klein, has nothing to do with a (false) conception of reconciliation whereby the fundamental antagonism between hate and love is overcome. Indeed, Klein maintains that

ambivalence is *heightened* by the experience of integration. The processes of integration and synthesis that are hallmarks of the depressive position, according to Klein, “cause the conflict between love and hatred to come out in full force. . . . Ambivalence is now experienced predominantly towards a complete object. Love and hatred have come much closer together and the ‘good’ and ‘bad’ breast, ‘good’ and ‘bad’ mother, cannot be kept as widely separated as in the earlier stage.”<sup>100</sup> Thus, integration signals, for Klein, not the reconciliation or overcoming of ambivalence but rather a mode of experience in which the psyche can withstand the fundamental ambivalence of its relationship to its primary object without resorting to the splitting and internal fragmentation that are the hallmarks of the paranoid-schizoid position.

Moreover, as I have discussed in more detail previously, the internal integration of the ego goes hand in hand with a greater synthesis or integration of the ego’s internal psychic reality with its objective social reality. In other words, the integration of the ego also entails the difficult, ongoing, and never-ending process of bringing one’s internal and external objects, the intrapsychic and intersubjective dimensions of experience, into closer alignment, while acknowledging that, given the fundamental and ineliminable role of phantasy in our psychic life, the gap between these two can never fully be closed.<sup>101</sup> Ego integration, for Klein, thus entails the twofold realization that “the loved object is at the same time the hated one,” and that “the real objects and the imaginary figures, both external and internal, are bound up with each other.”<sup>102</sup>

Accordingly, the goal of ego integration informs Klein’s conception of the aims of psychoanalysis. As she puts it:

In analysis we should make our way slowly and gradually towards the painful insight into the divisions in the patient’s self. This means that the destructive sides are again and again split off and regained, until greater integration comes about. As a result, the feeling of responsibility becomes stronger, and guilt and depression are more fully experienced. When this happens, the ego is strengthened, omnipotence of destructive impulses is diminished . . . and the capacity for love and gratitude, stifled in the course of splitting processes, is released. . . . By helping the patient to achieve a better integration of his self, [analysis] aims at a mitigation of hatred by love.<sup>103</sup>



From this passage, it is clear that ego strength and ego integration are more or less interchangeable terms for Klein. However, this connection reveals that ego strength for Klein has nothing to do with establishing rational mastery or the dominance of inner nature; rather, it simply refers to enhancing the ego's capacities for integration.

This passage also indicates some of the complicated and multivalent connections between ego integration and love. In some sense, love is a condition for the possibility of the capacity for integration, insofar as the experience of love and support from one's primary caregiver enables the infant's move into the depressive position. The various splitting mechanisms characteristic of the paranoid-schizoid position, Klein explains, "result in the feeling that the ego is in bits. This feeling amounts to a state of disintegration. In normal development, the states of disintegration which the infant experiences are transitory. Among other factors, gratification by the external good object again and again helps to break through these schizoid states."<sup>104</sup> Moreover, the transition to the depressive position represents the ascendancy of love over hate, insofar as Klein understands aggression as a destructive force that disintegrates and fragments both ego and its objects and love, by contrast, as an integrative force, as the drive to bind things together into greater unities.<sup>105</sup> Finally, in the depressive position and in the analytic situation, love and the drive for reparation emerge as countervailing forces that can help to mitigate the destructive effects of primary aggression.

The emphasis on love indicates that Klein's is an essentially expansive conception of the ego where integrating and strengthening the ego means augmenting or enriching the personality in a way that doesn't eliminate but rather embraces both ambivalence and difference. Because love is understood—in line with the late Freudian conception of Eros—as the capacity to bind things together in ever greater unities, this is an open-ended and incomplete process. Thus, as I discuss in more detail in the next chapter, just as the depressive position can never be fully worked through and left behind, there can be no such thing for Klein as complete integration of the ego. Whatever lies "beyond" the depressive position is just the continual working through of the initially overwhelming experience of depressive anxiety and the ongoing enhancement of one's abilities to manage ambivalence without resorting to splitting and other manic defenses. Increasing trust in one's capacity to love and in one's reparative abilities to

mitigate one's own destructiveness help to further the experience of integration,<sup>106</sup> as does more securely establishing one's internal good object, whether through the process of emotional maturation or through the work of analysis.<sup>107</sup> But none of this brings the process of integration to a close.

With this picture in place, we can return to the Lacanian and Adornian critique of the ego, outlined earlier. Does Klein's conception of ego integration present a whole, well-rounded ego that definitively integrates all of its fragmented states, thus racing to the "triumphant ego," as Lacan claims in his critique of object relations theory?<sup>108</sup> Is she committed to a coercive and rigid conception of ego integration, predicated on the domination of inner nature? Is the Kleinian ego narcissistic and paranoid, locked in the self-enclosed identity of its own projections, unable to relate to the object on its own terms? I think the answer to all of these questions is no, for the following reasons.

First, as I have just argued, Klein views both love and integration as fundamentally open-ended processes that are by definition incomplete and ongoing. As Klein puts the point: "Complete and permanent integration is in my view never possible. For under strain from external or internal sources, even well integrated people may be driven to stronger splitting processes, even though this may be a passing phase."<sup>109</sup> Even for the best-integrated ego, there is always the tendency to fall back into splitting and fragmentation, especially under times of stress. Hence there is no triumph of the ego, no possibility of a complete and definitive integration of all of the ego's fragmented states, no achievement of closure or wholeness.

Second, and relatedly, as I discussed in the previous chapter, Klein regards primary aggression as ineliminable. Thus, aggression constitutes an ever-present force that perpetually threatens us with falling back into splitting and fragmentation and that must be mitigated in an ongoing way through our capacities for love and reparation. Because primary aggression is ineliminable, there can be no ultimate reconciliation of ambivalence; the best we can hope for is to develop the capacities that enable us to better manage ambivalence.

Third, Klein's account of subject formation turns not only on integration but also on *loss*. The depressive position is, after all, *depressive*, melancholic. It emerges in response to an experience of loss—specifically, the loss of the idealized good object. For Klein, the idealization of the object is a

defense against persecutory anxiety.<sup>110</sup> Insofar as moving to the depressive position entails overcoming splitting and experiencing the object as a whole object, as both good and bad at the same time, it also entails the loss of idealization. In other words, moving to the depressive position requires giving up the phantasy of the idealized, all-powerful, and all-nourishing good breast (and its evil twin, the phantasy of the demonized, all-powerful, persecutory bad breast) and accepting the ambiguity and complexity of one's primary object and the ambivalence of one's relationship to it. Thus, the depressive position is predicated not only on the fear of having destroyed the good object with one's destructive attacks, but also on the actual loss of the idealized good object. Klein's distinction between manic and genuine forms of reparation is instructive here.<sup>111</sup> In manic reparation, the subject attempts to put the lost or shattered object back together and pretend that it never attacked or destroyed the object in the first place—pretends, in other words, to make the object and, by extension, itself *whole*. Genuine reparation, by contrast, involves accepting the loss of the idealized good object and the harm that one has done to the object in phantasy and in reality and *containing* all the resulting ambivalence, complexity, and ambiguity. For Klein, the illusion that the ego can triumphantly integrate all of its fragmented states is a form of manic defense against the melancholic structure of the ego.

Finally, Klein regards the integration of the ego as crucial to the move *out* of the paranoid-schizoid position, in which the psyche is caught up in its own projections and overwhelmed by phantasy and psychic reality. Although, as I argued in the previous chapter, Klein understands subjects as from the very beginning engaged in object relations, she also contends that in the paranoid-schizoid mode we are less in contact with the actual external others on whom our internal objects are based. So there is an image of a narcissistic and paranoid ego in Klein, but for her this is the relatively rudimentary and incoherent ego of the paranoid-schizoid position. The paranoid-schizoid ego mirrors Adorno's account of the ego in the grips of identity thinking, an image that Peter Dews describes evocatively as "the pathos of a self helplessly confined within the circle of its own immanence, unable to make contact with anything external which does not turn out to be simply its own reflection."<sup>112</sup> However, for Klein this self-enclosed, narcissistic ego is a relatively immature position that is mitigated, if never finally overcome, through the ongoing work of ego integration. Although,

as I have emphasized repeatedly, Klein insists that the gap between our intrapsychic phantasied representations of our objects and the actual external others on which those representations are based can never fully be closed—because to do so would be to eliminate unconscious phantasy altogether—it can be narrowed, and to do so is precisely to come closer to relating to the object on its own terms.

Ego integration, for Klein, is an ongoing, incomplete process of incorporating more and more unconscious content into a richer, more internally differentiated, and more expansive ego that can tolerate the ambivalence that results from the duality of the drives and can mitigate the distortions of phantasy in its object relations. When Klein cites Freud's dictum "Where id was there ego shall be," for her this means not that the ego rests on the repression of the id or the domination of inner nature, but that the ego continually expands outward, enriching itself by incorporating more and more previously split-off unconscious contents and engaging less narcissistically with others. When Klein says that the ultimate aim of psychoanalysis is the integration of the analysand's personality, this is not to be achieved by strengthening the ego at the expense of the unconscious—in that way, Klein's work is diametrically opposed to the ego psychology tradition—but rather through the ego's sympathetic, open-ended, and nondominating receptivity of otherness. Given Klein's emphasis on the melancholic structure of the depressive ego and her critique of manic reparation, her account of ego integration could be described using Adorno's evocative words as "a system of scars, which are integrated only under suffering, and never completely."<sup>113</sup>

## Kleinian Psychoanalysis and Adornian Negative Dialectics

Adorno was fond of paraphrasing a fragment from Epicharmus, which he rendered as follows: "Mortals must think mortal thoughts, not immortal ones."<sup>114</sup> This fragment, for Adorno, "contains within itself something like the critique of the traditional identity claim."<sup>115</sup> In other words, to acknowledge the mortality and finitude of the subject is tantamount to acknowledging its own limitations, including its inability to subsume all objects

under its concepts. However, on the dialectical flipside, it is only by thinking mortal thoughts that immortal ones may be grasped. By recognizing its own finitude and mortality, philosophy is capable of becoming infinite in a specific sense: not in the sense that it is “wholly in possession of its objects,”<sup>116</sup> but rather in the sense that it is “fundamentally open.”<sup>117</sup> In this way, philosophy is like the work of art; both are capable of crystallizing an infinite truth within a finite form. Because of this connection, the analysis of the work of art stands as prototype for cognition in general, and thus for philosophy (understood as cognition of reality).<sup>118</sup>

As I discussed earlier, Adorno never spells out in any detail what a non-reified form of subjectivity or psychic integration—one that would correspond to his account of the possibilities of genuine reconciliation between subject and object exemplified by the advanced work of art—might look like. However, he does occasionally offer glimpses of such an account—for example, in his essay “On Subject and Object.” There, Adorno argues, in line with his earlier critique of the ego, that the relationship between subject and object is one of domination. However, he is also quick to insist that this subject-object structure is the result of historically specific processes of coercion and domination and as such should not be hypostasized. As he puts it: “The separation of subject and object is both real and semblance. True, because in the realm of cognition it lends expression to the real separation, the rivenness of the human condition, the result of a coercive historical process; untrue, because the historical separation must not be hypostatized, not magically transformed into an invariant.”<sup>119</sup> Indeed, Adorno claims that the hypostasization of the separation between subject and object is responsible for reproducing the structure by means of which subject dominates and coerces object. When the separation between subject and object is rendered invariant rather than historically specific, he explains, “mind then arrogates to itself the status of being absolutely independent—which it is not: mind’s claim to independence announces its claim to domination. Once radically separated from the object, subject reduces the object to itself; subject swallows object, forgetting how much it is object itself.”<sup>120</sup>

In other words, the separation and opposition between subject and object is both true because it reflects an existing, historically produced structure of domination and, at the same time, false because the assumption that this separation is absolute and historically invariant reinforces the subject’s

claim to independence and thus to domination. Imagining itself as wholly independent, the subject subsumes the object into itself, reducing it to the structures of its own cognition or experience and conjuring away its own status as object, including its inner nature. However, the solution to this separation and hypostasization of the relationship between subject and object is not to posit a state of primordial unity or fusion between subject and object. As Adorno puts it, "The image of a temporal or extratemporal original state of blissful identity between subject and object is romantic, however: at times a wishful projection, today just a lie."<sup>121</sup> And it is in this context that Adorno offers a hint as to what a different form of subjectivity—one that was not predicated on the domination of objects (whether internal or external)—might look like: "Were speculation concerning the state of reconciliation allowed, then it would be impossible to conceive that state as either the undifferentiated unity of subject and object or their hostile antithesis: rather it would be the communication of what is differentiated . . . Peace is the state of differentiation without domination, with the differentiated participating in each other."<sup>122</sup> Here we see a brief sketch of what a nonreified logic of psychic integration might look like for Adorno, in which subject and object are distinct and differentiated but able to communicate and participate in one another in a peaceful, nondominating way.

If the problem is that the radical separation of subject from object leads to the subject's swallowing of the object, reducing the object to itself, the solution, for Adorno, lies in the infamous primacy (or priority or preponderance) of the object. This means that there is an irreducible asymmetry between subject and object; although objects can and do exist independently of subjects, subjects cannot exist independently of their status as object, which includes both their bodily nature and their rootedness in society. Hence, Adorno contends that "no matter how subject is defined, the existent being cannot be conjured away from it,"<sup>123</sup> and that there should be "no ego-consciousness without society, just as no society is beyond its individuals."<sup>124</sup> As Whitebook helpfully insists, Adorno's doctrine of the preponderance of the object is not a return to naïve realism; to say that the object possesses priority or independence vis-à-vis the subject is not to commit oneself to the claim that we can have *unmediated* access to the object. There is, for Adorno, no possibility of accessing a pure unmediated first nature.<sup>125</sup> But nor does this validate the idealist position, because, as Whitebook puts it, "consciousness or language, which (transcendentally) constitutes the

object, is itself (empirically) constituted by the object and cannot exist independently of it."<sup>126</sup> Unlike identity thinking, which attempts to resolve the aporias of the subject-object split by subsuming the object within the subject, "dialectical thinking," Whitebook explains, "tries to expand the circle to meet the object."<sup>127</sup> Or, as Adorno puts the point, "the subject's non-identity without sacrifice would be utopian."<sup>128</sup>

Although this brief sketch of an alternative, nondominating model of subjectivity is suggestive, it is admittedly very underdeveloped. Moreover, as Jessica Benjamin has argued, to the extent that it remains on the terrain of the subject-object relation, this model does not offer critical theory a compelling account of intersubjectivity.<sup>129</sup> In light of this concern, the turn to Klein to supplement and extend Adorno's sketch of nonreified cognition is especially helpful, precisely because, as I argued in the previous chapter, Klein's account of subject-object relations is at the same time an account of intersubjectivity inasmuch as the primary object is, for her, another person.

Moreover, building on my argument in the previous section, Klein's conception of the integrated ego—the ego in the depressive position—is not only *not* implicated in Adorno's critique of identity thinking; it also corresponds in interesting ways to Adorno's scattered remarks about nonreified cognition. Whereas Klein's paranoid-schizoid position corresponds to the problematic, coercive, compulsive, narcissistic ego that is the target of Adorno's critique, the ego in Klein's depressive position is above identity, in the sense that the fundamental ambivalence of the drives is retained without any subsumption or reconciliation of one by the other, and also above contradiction, in the sense that the splitting characteristic of the paranoid-schizoid position has been, at least momentarily, overcome.<sup>130</sup> The depressive ego is able to contain diverse and contradictory drives in a coherent way without either subsuming these drives under the rational mastery of the ego or splitting them into clashing poles.

In this way, we might say that Klein's account of reparation corresponds to Adorno's notion of genuine reconciliation. In contrast to the false harmony or reconciliation that is achieved through the denial of the deeply antagonistic character of the drives or their subsumption under the mastery of the rational ego, Klein's vision of the depressive ego's ability to withstand the ineliminable ambivalence between hate and love corresponds to Adorno's description of negative dialectics as the *nonidentity* of identity and



nonidentity. Her emphasis on ambivalence—indeed, I would argue that Klein is second only to Freud as the preeminent thinker of ambivalence in the psychoanalytic tradition—coheres with Adorno's focus on social antagonisms and contradictions. Like Adornian negative dialectics, Klein's model of ego integration avoids the tyranny of identity thinking, which seeks to merge identity and nonidentity into a higher order of identity (or unity). And yet she offers a distinctive and compelling vision of genuine reconciliation: an account of integration that focuses on preserving and gathering together in a nonviolent, nondominating, even loving way the nonidentity of identity and nonidentity—that is, of subject and objects (both internal *and* external).

Klein's emphasis on unconscious phantasy and her complicated account of the relationship between the intersubjective and intrapsychic aspects of experience also corresponds in interesting ways to Adorno's claim about the preponderance or priority of the object, while simultaneously extending this claim to the realm of relationships with others. For Adorno, identity thinking—the phantasy that objects can be completely subsumed under concepts with no remainder—is connected to the subject's forgetting of its own objective nature, including its drives. Klein's work, by contrast, highlights the ineliminable role of the drives and of their psychic correlate, unconscious phantasy. Her account thus does justice to what Adorno regards as the irreducibly objective, "natural" element of human experience: the drives. At the same time, Klein acknowledges that even if the gap between our internal and external objects can never fully be closed, to bring them into better alignment is tantamount to reducing the degree of paranoid projection in our relations with others and thus coming closer to doing justice to them by relating to them on their own terms. Her insistence that we can never fully close the gap between ourselves and our objects could be read as an analogue to Adorno's insistence on the priority or preponderance of the object; there is, for both Klein and Adorno, always an ineffable aspect of the object that cannot be reduced to my subjective experience of it. In Kleinian terms, we might say that all of our experiences of others are mediated and filtered through the lens of intrapsychic phantasy, but there is something of the object that exceeds this subjective dimension of our experience. Intrapsychic phantasy cannot be eliminated—there is no unmediated access to the object, no form of intersubjectivity that is not

filtered through the lens of phantasy—but neither can our object relations be reduced to intrapsychic phantasy. The gap between the intrapsychic and the intersubjective can never be fully closed in either direction.

C. Fred Alford has made a similar argument relating Klein to Adorno, though with some differences that are significant and, I think, instructive. Alford connects Klein to Adorno through their aesthetics, contending that Klein, like Adorno, regards art as an expression of “the desire to restore a shattered whole.”<sup>131</sup> For Alford, this view of art resonates with Adorno’s, for whom “the wholeness and unity to be remembered in the work of art are the wholeness, unity, and integrity of the object itself. In art, and perhaps in art alone, can this wholeness be grasped, because art is less conceptual than philosophy: art lets the object be (mimesis), it reveals the object in its totality, rather than seeking to understand and control it by forcing it into fixed categories.”<sup>132</sup> In this way, Alford claims, “Adorno’s view comes closer to Kleinian aesthetics, in which art expresses concern for the integrity of the object, an object destroyed by greed and aggression.”<sup>133</sup>

However, Alford goes on to fault Klein with stressing “the achievement of wholeness, restoration, unity, and completeness. . . . to such an extent that the idea of art telling us the truth about a broken, fragmented reality, except by complete contrast, tends to be lost.”<sup>134</sup> This reading downplays the importance of ambivalence in Klein’s view of reparation and the related central role of destructiveness and ugliness in Kleinian aesthetics. Hanna Segal gets much closer to the truth of Klein’s view of art when she writes:

A satisfactory work of art is achieved by a realization and sublimation of the depressive position. . . . But to realize and symbolically express depression the artist must acknowledge the death instinct, both in its aggressive and self-destructive aspects, and accept the reality of death for the object and the self. . . . Restated in terms of instincts, ugliness—destruction—is the expression of the death instinct; beauty—the desire to unite into rhythms and wholes—is that of the life instinct. The achievement of the artist is in giving the fullest expression to the conflict and the union between the two.<sup>135</sup>

In other words, the work of art for Klein may express some sort of unity or integration, but this is an internally broken, fractured, and conflictual unity: to use Adorno’s language once again, it is a “system of scars, . . . integrated . . .

under suffering, and never completely.” Moreover, the suggestion that Klein’s vision emphasizes wholeness, unity, and completeness only makes sense if one overlooks or seriously downplays Klein’s critique of manic reparation, which clearly suggests that a complete restoration of wholeness is not only impossible but also a manic illusion. Indeed, given Klein’s rejection of primary narcissism, there is no preexisting wholeness to be restored; there is only ambivalence all the way down.

This interpretive disagreement aside, I find Alford’s Kleinian inspired conception of what he calls “reparative reason”—a conception that he links to Adorno’s aesthetic account of nonreified cognition—to be quite productive. Alford defines reparative reason as a mode of reason that “is sensitive to the complexities and nuances of objects, rather than forcing them into rigid, prefabricated categories.”<sup>136</sup> Alford reads reparative reason as an alternative to instrumental reason, which, in Kleinian terms, appears as a paranoid-schizoid mode of relating to objects of knowledge. But, unlike Adorno and Horkheimer, who mostly rest content with their searing critique of instrumental reason, Klein envisions an alternative. As Alford puts it: “Whereas paranoid-schizoid (instrumental) reason sees its objects in terms of the categories of prediction, manipulation, and control, reparative reason experiences its objects as they are mediated by a richer, more creative set of phantasies, phantasies concerned with precisely what Adorno wished art to concern itself with: assisting the object to become itself. This, ultimately, is what reparation is about.”<sup>137</sup> To this I would add that Klein’s account of reparative reason goes together with a rich and complicated account of intersubjectivity, one that understands the subject in fundamentally relational terms while at the same time avoiding the temptation to flatten out intersubjectivity by draining our relations with others of the negativity of primary aggression and the resulting ambivalence and complexity.



Reimagining reason in a reparative mode means that we need not bite the bullet and accept the bourgeois model of rationality and its compulsive conception of ego integration on the grounds that doing so is necessary for preserving the possibility of critical resistance to fascism. For Klein, ego integration refers not to the domination of inner, instinctual nature, but

instead to the expansion and enrichment of the ego through the incorporation of more unconscious content. For Klein, there is no race to the triumphant ego, as Lacan alleges, nor is the ego ever definitively integrated. Rather, ego integration is a never-ending process, founded upon loss, in which ambivalence is not overcome but rather withstood and ongoingly worked through. In this way, the Kleinian ego resembles Adorno's evocative image of a system of scars, integrated through suffering, and never completely.

At the same time, as a result of her emphasis on the death drive understood as primary aggression, Klein avoids the conformist tendency of the revisionists to smooth over the contradictions between unconscious phantasy and bourgeois society. A critic of false images of harmony and reconciliation, she preserves what Adorno identifies as a Freudian emphasis on antagonism, nonidentity, and ambivalence while at the same time offering a complex psychological and social account of the drives. Moreover, she does so without doubling down on the repressive ego, suggesting a model of ego integration that takes aggression, negativity, and ambivalence seriously without thereby justifying the internalization of domination. In this way, Klein shows a way out of the paradox of authoritarianism.

Finally, Klein's way out of this paradox resonates powerfully with Adorno's few, scattered remarks about nonreified thinking. The depressive position entails an open-ended, nonrepressive, nondominating togetherness of difference, aligned with Adorno's description of nonreified thinking as a nontotalizing and open-ended "togetherness of diversity" that is "above identity and above contradiction."<sup>138</sup> Klein's depressive position is above identity and also above contradiction, able to *contain* diverse and contradictory drives without either subsuming these drives under the rational mastery of the ego or splitting them into clashing poles. For Klein, unconscious phantasy represents an ineliminable moment of nonidentity—an ineffable aspect of our experience that cannot be fully assimilated into conscious, subjective experience. In this way, Klein remains mindful of nature within.<sup>139</sup>

120. Klein, 54.
121. In connection with this idea, see Klein's fascinating discussion of two types of anxiety—the one arising intersubjectively, from the infant's perception of their radical dependence on their mother, and the other arising intrapsychically—in her essay "On the Theory of Anxiety and Guilt," in *Envy and Gratitude and Other Works*. For discussion, see Allen and Ruti, *Critical Theory Between Klein and Lacan*, 63–94.
122. Benjamin, *Shadow of the Other Subject*, 90.
123. Jacques Lacan, *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book II: The Ego in Freud's Theory and in the Technique of Psychoanalysis, 1954–55*, ed. Jacques Alain-Miller, trans. Sylvia Tomaselli (New York: W. W. Norton, 1991), 241. Although Lacan does not mention Klein by name, and although most of his critique in this seminar concerns the reception of the object-relations tradition in France, his description of ego integration in this passage seems implicitly aimed at a Kleinian account. Thanks to Inara Marin for pushing me to clarify this point.

## 2. A System of Scars

1. Joel Whitebook, *Perversion and Utopia: A Study in Psychoanalysis and Critical Theory* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995), 91–118.
2. For the first quote, see Sigmund Freud, *New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis*, in *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, vol. 22 (1932–36), ed. James Strachey (London: Vintage, 2001), 80. For the second, see Freud, "A Difficulty in the Path of Psycho-analysis," in *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, vol. 17 (1917–19), ed. James Strachey (London: Vintage, 2001), 143. For discussion, see Whitebook, *Perversion and Utopia*, 91–92.
3. For a similar argument about how post-Freudian psychoanalysis failed to maintain the complex ambiguities—perhaps even contradictions—of Freud's thinking, see Peter Dews, *Logics of Disintegration: Poststructuralist Thought and the Claims of Critical Theory* (London: Verso, 1987), 55–106.
4. See Whitebook, *Perversion and Utopia*, 92–99.
5. Freud, *Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety*, in *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, vol. 20 (1925–26), ed. James Strachey (London: Vintage, 2001), 97.
6. See Whitebook, *Perversion and Utopia*, 111–13.
7. Freud, *Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety*, 97ff.
8. Whitebook, *Perversion and Utopia*, 117.
9. Whitebook, 117.
10. As I discuss further in the next chapter, Whitebook later refers to this strand of Freud's thinking as his unofficial position on the psyche. See Whitebook, *Freud: An Intellectual Biography* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 1–16.

11. For discussion of the similarities between Adorno's and Lacan's critique of the ego, see Whitebook, *Perversion and Utopia*, 133. For an account of the relationship between Lacan and Adorno that is more sympathetic to Lacan, see Claudia Leeb, *Power and Feminist Agency in Capitalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017).
12. For a related argument that does not reference Klein, see Whitebook, *Perversion and Utopia*, 152–64.
13. Peter Dews, "Adorno, Post-Structuralism and the Critique of Identity," *New Left Review* 1, no. 157 (May–June 1986): 28–44, 43.
14. Dews, "Adorno, Post-Structuralism, and the Critique of Identity," 43.
15. Theodor Adorno, "Revisionist Psychoanalysis," trans. Nan-Nan Lee, *Philosophy and Social Criticism* 40, no. 3 (2014): 326–38, 328.
16. For Adorno and Horkheimer, the domination of inner nature goes hand in hand with the domination of outer nature, including the domination of other human beings. Since my focus here is on the ego as a structure of internalized domination, I set aside this aspect of their critique.
17. Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, *Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical Fragments*, trans. Edmund Jephcott (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2002), 26.
18. Adorno and Horkheimer, *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, 43.
19. Adorno and Horkheimer, 35.
20. Adorno and Horkheimer, 47–48.
21. Adorno and Horkheimer, 53.
22. Adorno, *Negative Dialectics*, trans. E. B. Ashton (London: Continuum, 1973), 272.
23. Adorno, *Negative Dialectics*, 272.
24. Adorno, 272.
25. Adorno, 271, translation modified.
26. Adorno, 272–73.
27. Joel Whitebook, "The Marriage of Marx and Freud: Critical Theory and Psychoanalysis," in *The Cambridge Companion to Critical Theory*, ed. Fred Rush (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 78.
28. Whitebook, "Marriage of Marx and Freud," 78.
29. Whitebook, 79.
30. Whitebook, 79.
31. Whitebook, 81.
32. Joel Whitebook, "Weighty Objects: Adorno's Kant-Freud Interpretation," in *The Cambridge Companion to Adorno*, ed. Thomas Huhn (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 70.
33. Whitebook, "Marriage of Marx and Freud," 80.
34. Whitebook, "Weighty Objects," 71.
35. Whitebook, 71.
36. Adorno and Horkheimer, *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, 26.
37. Whitebook, "Weighty Objects," 72–73.
38. Whitebook, 69.



39. For further elaboration of this reading, see Amy Allen, *The End of Progress: Decolonizing the Normative Foundations of Critical Theory* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2016), 166–76. For a related reading that also connects the argument of *Dialectic of Enlightenment* to Freudian psychoanalytic concepts, see Natalia Baeza, “Adorno’s ‘Wicked Queen of Snow White’: Paranoia, Fascism, and the Fate of Modernity,” *European Journal of Psychoanalysis*, <https://www.journal-psychoanalysis.eu/adornos-wicked-queen-of-snow-white/> (accessed February 20, 2020).
40. Adorno, *Negative Dialectics*, 281.
41. See Whitebook, *Perversion and Utopia*, 138.
42. Jessica Benjamin, “The End of Internalization: Adorno’s Social Psychology,” *Telos* 32 (June 1977): 42–64, 42.
43. Benjamin, “End of Internalization,” 44. On this point, see also Whitebook, *Perversion and Utopia*, 135–40; Whitebook, “Marriage of Marx and Freud,” 79; and Susan Buck-Morss, *The Origin of Negative Dialectics: Theodor W. Adorno, Walter Benjamin, and the Frankfurt Institute* (New York: Free Press, 1977), 82.
44. See Lars Rensmann, *The Politics of Unreason: The Frankfurt School and the Origins of Modern Antisemitism* (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2017).
45. See Theodor Adorno, Else Frenkel-Brunswik, Daniel J. Levinson, and R. Nevitt Sanford, *The Authoritarian Personality*, ed. Max Horkheimer and Samuel Flowerman (New York: Norton, 1982).
46. Rensmann, *Politics of Unreason*, 83–84.
47. For insightful and elegant discussion of these issues, see Peter Gordon, “The Authoritarian Personality Revisited: Reading Adorno in the Age of Trump,” in Wendy Brown, Peter Gordon, and Max Pensky, *Authoritarianism: Three Inquiries in Critical Theory* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2018), 45–84.
48. Theodor Adorno, “Freudian Theory and the Pattern of Fascist Propaganda,” in *The Essential Frankfurt School Reader*, ed. Andrew Arato and Eike Gepphardt (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 1982), 120.
49. Adorno, “Freudian Theory,” 136.
50. For an argument to this effect, see C. Fred Alford, *Melanie Klein and Critical Social Theory: An Account of Politics, Art, and Reason Based on Her Psychoanalytic Theory* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2001), 143–45.
51. Theodor Adorno, *Lectures on Negative Dialectics: Fragments of a Lecture Course 1965/1966*, ed. Rolf Tiedemann, trans. Rodney Livingstone (Cambridge: Polity, 2008), 8–9.
52. See Adorno, *Lectures on Negative Dialectics*, 7.
53. See Michel Foucault, “Preface,” in Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, trans. Robert Hurley, Mark Seem, and Helen R. Lane (London: Continuum, 2004), xiv–xv.
54. For a trenchant feminist critique of this move, see Robyn Marasco, “‘Already the Effect of the Whip’: Critical Theory and the Feminine Ideal,” *differences* 17, no. 1 (2006): 88–115, 101–6. Although Marasco’s discussion of this point focuses on Marcuse and Horkheimer, the point can easily be extended to Adorno.



55. Adorno, "Revisionist Psychoanalysis," 332.
56. Benjamin, "End of Internalization," 42–43.
57. For a related diagnosis of the paradox of the ego in the early Frankfurt School, and a similar turn to Klein to "successfully address problems the Frankfurt School took seriously but could not solve," see Alford, *Melanie Klein and Critical Social Theory*, 13. My disagreements with Alford's reading will be made clear in the last section of the chapter.
58. Adorno's critique of revisionism focuses on the work of Karen Horney, but the former member of the Frankfurt School, Erich Fromm, is also clearly a target.
59. Theodor Adorno, "Sociology and Psychology (Part 1)," trans. Irving Wohlfarth, *New Left Review* 1, no. 46 (November–December 1967): 67–80, 69.
60. Adorno, "Sociology and Psychology (Part 1)," 70.
61. Adorno, "Sociology and Psychology (Part 1)," 74.
62. Adorno, "Revisionist Psychoanalysis," 326.
63. Adorno, 327.
64. Adorno, 328.
65. Adorno, 329.
66. Adorno, 329.
67. Adorno, 331.
68. Adorno, 332.
69. Adorno, 333.
70. Adorno, 332–33.
71. Adorno, 334.
72. Adorno, 335.
73. Adorno, 336.
74. Adorno, 336.
75. Adorno, 336.
76. Adorno, 336.
77. Adorno, 337.
78. Adorno, 337. See also Adorno, "Sociology and Psychology (Part 1)," 68.
79. Adorno, "Revisionist Psychoanalysis," 337.
80. Adorno, 337.
81. Adorno, "Sociology and Psychology (Part 1)," 75.
82. Alford, *Melanie Klein and Critical Social Theory*, 8.
83. Alford, 10.
84. Whitebook, "Marriage of Marx and Freud," 99n12.
85. See Melanie Klein, "Envy and Gratitude," in *Envy and Gratitude and Other Works 1946–1963* (New York: Free Press, 1975), 220–21.
86. Klein, "Envy and Gratitude," 233.
87. Klein, 183–84.
88. For a related discussion, see Whitebook, "Marriage of Marx and Freud," 82. Whitebook turns not to Klein but to Hans Loewald for the kind of differentiated and expansive account of ego integration that I explore in this section. Without

denying the importance of Loewald's work, I find related resources in Klein along with a strong emphasis on an ambivalent but thoroughly relational conception of the drives and thus a compelling and original way of preserving the moment of nonidentity and negativity within the self.

89. For discussion, see Susan Buck-Morss, *Origin of Negative Dialectics*, 63–64.
90. Adorno and Horkheimer, *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, 94–136.
91. Adorno and Horkheimer, 100.
92. Adorno and Horkheimer, 124.
93. Theodor Adorno, *Negative Dialectics*, 362.
94. Theodor Adorno, "Sociology and Psychology (Part 2)," trans. Irving Wohlfarth, *New Left Review* 1, no. 47 (January–February 1968): 79–97, 83.
95. Klein, "Envy and Gratitude," 231.
96. Klein, "Notes on Some Schizoid Mechanisms," in *Envy and Gratitude and Other Works*, 4.
97. Klein, "Notes on Some Schizoid Mechanisms," 6.
98. Klein, "On the Development of Mental Functioning," in *Envy and Gratitude and Other Works*, 245.
99. Klein, "Notes on Some Schizoid Mechanisms," 14.
100. Klein, "Some Theoretical Conclusions Regarding the Emotional Life of the Infant," in *Envy and Gratitude and Other Works*, 72–73.
101. See discussion of this point in chapter 1.
102. Klein, "A Contribution to the Psychogenesis of Manic-Depressive States," in *Love, Guilt, and Reparation and Other Works, 1921–1945* (New York: Free Press, 1975), 285–86.
103. Klein, "Envy and Gratitude," 225.
104. Klein, "Notes on Some Schizoid Mechanisms," 10.
105. See Klein, "On the Development of Mental Functioning," 238–39.
106. Klein, "Mourning and Its Relation to Manic-Depressive States," in *Love, Guilt and Reparation and Other Works, 1921–1945* (New York: Free Press, 1975), 353.
107. Klein, "Envy and Gratitude," 221–22.
108. Jacques Lacan, *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book II: The Ego in Freud's Theory and in the Technique of Psychoanalysis, 1954–55*, ed. Jacques Alain-Miller, trans. Sylvana Tomaselli (New York: Norton, 1991), 241.
109. Klein, "Envy and Gratitude," 233.
110. Klein, 193.
111. See Klein, "Some Theoretical Conclusions," 75.
112. Dews, "Adorno, Post-Structuralism, and the Critique of Identity," 42.
113. Adorno, "Revisionist Psychoanalysis," 328.
114. Adorno, *Lectures on Negative Dialectics*, 80. See also Adorno, *Against Epistemology: A Metacritique*, trans. Willis Domingo (Cambridge: Polity, 2013).
115. Adorno, *Lectures on Negative Dialectics*, 80.
116. Adorno, 84.
117. Adorno, 80.

118. Adorno, 84. On this point, see Susan Buck-Morss, *Origin of Negative Dialectics*, 123.
119. Theodor Adorno, "On Subject and Object," in *Critical Models: Interventions and Catchwords*, trans. Henry Pickford (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 246.
120. Adorno, "On Subject and Object," 246.
121. Adorno, 246.
122. Adorno, 247.
123. Adorno, 249–50.
124. Adorno, *Negative Dialectics*, 36.
125. "The primacy of the object is the *intentio obliqua* [reflective act] of the *intentio obliqua* [reflective act], not the warmed over *intentio recta* [thing in itself]; the corrective to the subjective reduction, not the denial of a subjective share" (Adorno, "On Subject and Object," 250).
126. Whitebook, "Weighty Objects," 63.
127. Whitebook, 64. Whitebook links this expansive conception of psychic integration to an account of sublimation, which enables him to sketch the possibility of "less violent, increasingly flexible, and more spontaneous forms of postconventional psychic integration" (59).
128. Adorno, *Negative Dialectics*, 281.
129. Benjamin, "End of Internalization."
130. On this point, see Teresa Brennan, *History After Lacan* (New York: Routledge, 1993), 93–100.
131. Alford, *Melanie Klein and Critical Social Theory*, 105–6.
132. Alford, 115.
133. Alford, 115.
134. Alford, 116.
135. Hanna Segal, "A Psychoanalytic Approach to Aesthetics," in *Reading Melanie Klein*, ed. Lyndsey Stonebridge and John Phillips (New York: Routledge, 1998), 203–22, 219. For further discussion of this passage in the context of a comparison of Klein's and Lacan's conceptions of creativity, see Amy Allen and Mari Ruti, *Critical Theory between Klein and Lacan: A Dialogue* (New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2019), 175–77.
136. Alford, *Melanie Klein and Critical Social Theory*, 138.
137. Alford, 152.
138. Adorno, *Negative Dialectics*, 150.
139. For a helpful discussion of this point in Adorno, see Deborah Cook, *Adorno on Nature* (New York: Routledge, 2011), 34–61.

### 3. Beyond Developmentalism

1. Joel Whitebook, *Freud: An Intellectual Biography* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 11.
2. Whitebook, *Freud*, 146.